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The credit crunch was most likely viewed as a mixed
blessing by many private equity executives. On the one
hand, it signalled the end of the most favourable set of
economic conditions the private equity industry had
ever witnessed: abundant capital, low interest rates,
increasing stock market values and a truly amazing
willingness amongst banks and other investors to pro-
vide debt financing on a scale and on terms never pre-
viously observed. But the clouds that have descended
since August 2007 have at least one silver lining: the
intense public scrutiny of the private equity industry
has been, to some extent, diverted into other areas of
the  financial  system,  in  particular  the  investment
banks,  rating  agencies,  imploding  hedge  funds  and
structured vehicles etc. During this crisis, private equi-
ty funds have attracted little attention, except for their
activities in taking advantage of banks’ desire to sell
debt  backing  private  equity  deals.  But  the  private
equity industry remains active, having attracted large
amounts of committed capital, and is continuing to
invest – albeit not in the headline grabbing purchases
of large public companies. And public scrutiny is re-
developing. 
In this chapter we explore the current state of the
academic and policy debate regarding private equity.
Why has the private equity industry grown so strong-
ly?  Was  this  growth  fuelled  mainly  by  cheap  and
abundant debt? How does private equity create value,
and is this done at the expense of workers or other
stakeholders? Does private equity contribute to sys-
temic  risks  in  the  financial  system?  Should  private
equity be regulated more vigorously, and, if so, in
what  ways?  How  will  the  credit  crunch  impact  on
existing  private  equity-owned  companies?  What
impact will the expansion of private equity have on
national tax revenues, and is the tax-treatment of pri-
vate equity companies, or the executives who work in
private  equity,  unfair?  We  will  address  these  ques-
tions in the context of the recent European experi-
ence and policy debates.
But  before  addressing  these  questions  the  chapter
starts by providing a brief primer on private equity.
Despite  the  recent  media  and  public  attention,  the
workings of the private equity industry are opaque
and  often  misunderstood.  Section  2  defines  terms,
explains the simple economics of the private equity
industry, and how it draws on other parts of the finan-
cial system, and presents some key statistics about the
private equity sector. 
The attention that private equity has recently attract-
ed – particularly leveraged buy-outs (LBOs), which
constitute a large proportion of the money invested –
comes in three main forms. 
First, the critics of private equity often claim that pri-
vate  equity  creates  little  enduring  value  but  rather
makes returns for investors by imposing excessive lev-
els of debt on the companies they buy, cutting jobs
and investment, and reducing the taxes they pay to
governments. We discuss the evidence regarding the
impact of private equity on the companies they invest
in and on the extent of value creation in section 3.
Indicative  of the  concerns  regarding  private  equity,
Poul Nyrup Rasmussen – the President of the Party of
European Socialists in the European Parliament, and
a leading critic of the private equity industry – recent-
ly claimed, “These ‘leveraged buyouts’ leave the com-
pany  saddled  with  debt  and  interest  payments,  its
workers are laid off, and its assets are sold. A once
profitable and healthy company is milked for short-
term profits, benefiting neither workers nor the real
economy” (Rasmussen, 2008). This represents the lat-
est in a series of critical opinions of private equity,
which started in earnest with the “locusts” badge that
was  pinned  on  the  industry  by  German  politician
Franz Muntefering in 2004. He claimed that private
equity funds act as “irresponsible locust swarms, who
measure success in quarterly intervals, suck off sub-
stance  and  let  companies  die  once  they  have  eaten
them  away”.  This  badge  has  largely  stuck  with  the
industry. As general statements, these are gross mis-
representations of the workings of private equity, as
shall  be  explained  in  the  course  of the  chapter.
However, some of the blame for such misunderstand-ing arguably lies with the private equity sector itself,
which has provided relatively little systematic and con-
vincing evidence to rebut these claims. It is only recent-
ly that independent academic research has started to
shine a light into the workings of private equity. 
This leads into the second main area of concern: the
appropriate level of transparency and reporting by pri-
vate equity funds and the companies they invest in.
This  has  been  the  subject  of considerable  attention
within Europe in the last two years. The Walker Review
in the UK examined these issues in depth and has been
followed by similar reviews in other European coun-
tries. We discuss these issues in section 4.
The third main area of concern is taxation. The lever-
age in LBOs creates tax shields which can mean sig-
nificant reductions in the amount of corporate tax
paid by the companies that are acquired by private
equity. On the one hand, this may simply be a more
efficient way of financing companies, resulting in a
lower cost of capital, which might be good for invest-
ment levels and equity valuation. On the other hand,
tax authorities lose corporate tax receipts. In addition
to these questions of corporate taxation, there is also
a set of highly political issues relating to the personal
taxation of private equity executives. To a large extent
these  derive  from  the  unusual  structure  of private
equity  funds,  whereby  the  private  equity  executives
share in the profits of the fund, but these profit shares
are  frequently  taxed  as  capital  gains  rather  than
income. Since many countries set capital gains taxes at
lower rates than income taxes, a major political issue
has arisen in both Europe and the US. This set of tax-
ation issues is discussed in section 5. Conclusions are
drawn in section 6.
2. A primer on private equity
Private equity refers to the entire
asset class of equity investments
that  are  not  quoted  on  stock
markets.  So  private  equity
stretches from venture capital –
working  with  really  early  stage
companies  that  in  many  cases
will have no revenues but poten-
tially good ideas or technology –
right through to large buy-outs,
where  the  private  equity  firm
buys  the  whole  company.  In
some  cases  these  companies
might  themselves  be  quoted  on
the stock market, and the private equity fund per-
forms a so-called public-to-private transaction, there-
by removing the entire company from the stock mar-
ket. But in the majority of cases buy-out transactions
will involve privately owned companies, such as fam-
ily-owned companies or a particular division of an
existing (public or private) company. 
In  between  these  two  extremes  are  other  forms  of
later-stage  financing,  such  as  providing  expansion
capital to develop existing businesses. However, the
two main forms of private equity are venture capital
(VC) and buyouts. As will be explained, one of the
contentious aspects of buyouts is that they typically
employ significant amounts of debt, and hence are
referred to as leveraged buy-outs (LBO). 
The  European  private  equity  industry  has  grown
strongly in recent years. Figure 3.1 shows the recent
data for  both  funds  raised  and  invested, where the
funds have European companies as their targets. The
way private equity funds work is that investors make
commitments of capital, but the money is only drawn
down when the fund finds a company to invest in, or
to  purchase  outright.  Hence  there  is  a  distinction
between money raised and invested, as demonstrated
in Figure 3.1. Investors have been allocating increas-
ing  amounts  to  private  equity  funds  targeting
European companies, with over  70bn of equity being
invested in both 2006 and 2007. What Figure 3.1 also
shows is that there is currently a significant overhang
of unspent  commitments,  as  fundraising  has  raced
ahead of investment. Therefore, even without any fur-
ther fundraising there exists a large amount of capital
currently looking for investment within Europe. 
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It is also worth noting that these
figures  only  refer  to  the  equity
invested  –  LBOs,  by  definition,
employ  significant  amounts  of
debt.  As  a  result,  the  scale  of
transactions  involving  private
equity  are  usually  2  to  3 times
larger  than  the  equity  invested.
The recent trends in leverage, and
pricing,  for  European  private
equity  buyouts  can  be  seen  in
Figure 3.2. Given the importance
of cash-flow in LBOs – since cash
is required to service the interest
on  debt  –  capital  structure  and
pricing of transactions is typical-
ly expressed in terms of multiples
of earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation  and  amortisation
(EBITDA),  which  gives  an  esti-
mate of cash flow (before consid-
ering  capital  expenditures).
Through the economic cycle, and
across all transactions, the aver-
age level of debt has been about
5 times  EBITDA,  relative  to  a
total transaction value of about
7 times EBITDA, implying an equity contribution of
about 30 percent. However, the impact of the credit
boom can be seen clearly in the figures, with average
debt levels and purchase prices rising to multiples, at
the peak of the market, of over 7 and 10 respectively.
The  proportionate  equity  contribution  did  not,  on
average, change too much, but clearly the portfolio
companies had a significantly larger amount of debt
to service. 
Critically,  the  debt  in  private  equity  transactions  is
taken on by the companies that are acquired, not by
the fund itself. Furthermore, there is no recourse for
debt investors either to the assets of the fund or other
portfolio companies. Therefore, unlike hedge funds,
which  often  take  on  significant  leverage  within  the
fund, private equity funds themselves are not lever-
aged; the portfolio companies are. Consequently, pri-
vate equity funds will not suffer the sort of meltdowns
observed in the hedge fund sec-
tor, although some of the compa-
nies  acquired  by  private  equity
funds  are  likely  to  default  on
their debts. We return later to the
issue  of whether  large-scale
defaults  should  be  expected  for
companies  acquired  during  the
credit boom.
Since  buyouts  employ  a  large
amount  of debt  financing,  the
total  value  of transactions
involving private equity funds is
much  larger  than  the  (equity)
funds that are raised. This can be
seen in Figure 3.3, which shows
that total European transactions
Figure 3.2
Box 3.1 
What is a private equity fund? 
As their name implies, private equity (PE) funds invest in the equity of 
private  companies  –  that  is,  companies  that  are  not listed  on  stock
exchanges, or, in the case of public-to-private transactions, cease to be
listed once taken over by a private equity fund. In the case of public
companies there  is  normally a  separation  between  ownership  and 
control, but PE funds often take controlling stakes or, in the case of
buyouts, purchase the whole company. PE funds therefore both provide 
capital and control the strategy of the firm. Private equity has become an
established  asset  class deriving most of  their funds  from  institutional
investors such as pension funds, endowments, insurance companies and
sovereign wealth funds. PE funds generally focus on buying equity in
companies, although  in  2007  some  funds started  buying  the  deeply
discounted  debt  of existing  buyouts.  However,  in  the case  of more 
mature companies with predicable cash flow, they purchase their targets
using a significant amount of debt. Unlike their hedge fund cousins, this
debt is put into the acquired company rather than being retained in the 
fund itself.  Hedge funds and PE funds share the same “two and twenty”
fee and incentive structure. The two refers to a 2% annual management
fee, and the twenty to a 20% share in any profits. In practice, although
the twenty is more or less ubiquitous, the two has been shrinking as PE
funds have become larger. Two key differences between hedge funds
and PE funds are (i) investors commit capital for the strictly-limited 10-
year life of the fund; the PE fund invests in companies and then returns 
the proceeds to investors; and (ii) the executives in PE funds receive 
their profit share on the basis of the ultimate performance of the entire
portfolio  once all the cash  has  been  returned to  investors,  not, as in
hedge funds, as an annual profit share payment. These differences make
PE  funds  more  stable  in  terms  of  their  financing  and  personnel,  and 
more long-term in focus, in comparison with hedge funds.involving  private  equity  funds  exceeded   200bn  in
both 2006 and 2007. Buyouts by private equity funds
are really just a particular type of merger and acquisi-
tion  (M&A)  activity:  private  equity  funds’ involve-
ment in global M&A has been growing strongly in
recent years, peaking at 27 percent of total transac-
tions (by value) in 2006. However, as long as the cur-
rent conditions in the debt markets persist, the share
of private equity will fall significantly, to the benefit
of traditional corporate acquirors who will face less
competition. 
While the European private equity industry has been
growing strongly, all the growth has been focused on
buy-outs rather than venture capital. As recently as
2002  around  30  percent  of European  funds  were
raised for VC investments, with the remainder allocat-
ed to buyouts. However, in recent years, despite the
various efforts of governments to boost the VC indus-
try, funds raised have stagnated as the private equity
industry  as  a  whole  has  grown  strongly.  This  has
resulted in a significant fall in VC as a proportion of
total funds raised: within Europe only 15 percent of
total funds raised over the period 2005–07 were tar-
geted at VC. The corresponding growth in the share,
and absolute value, of buyout funds has been mainly
associated with the growth of very large buyout funds
that are capable of taking over companies worth sev-
eral billion euros. This trend can be seen in Figure 3.3,
which shows the growth in the scale and nature of pri-
vate equity transactions in Europe in recent years, in
particular the growth of the billion euro plus deals.
But  as  the  deals  have  got  larger,  the  targets  have
become familiar companies, often household names,
which helps to explain the growth in media, political
and  trade  union  attention  that
private  equity  funds  have
“enjoyed”.
Where  does  the  money  come
from  and  who  runs  the  private
equity funds? Most of the money
comes  from  institutional  inves-
tors,  such  as  pension  funds,
endowments and insurance com-
panies,  although  high-net-worth
individuals also invest directly or
through fund of funds intermedi-
aries – who provide them with a
more  diversified  portfolio  of
investments.  It  is  interesting  to
note, in the context of the current
policy debates, which, as we dis-
cuss  later,  often  cast  private  equity  as  operating
against the interests of workers, that pension funds
are probably the most significant beneficiaries from
any successes that private equity may achieve. This
irony  was  noted  by  Phillip  Jennings,  General
Secretary of the UNI Global Union who remarked:
“Unions need to be aware that the money they are
paying into pension funds is feeding the beast that
may devour them.”
In terms of asset allocation, at present the proportion
of investment portfolios that are allocated to private
equity is considerably higher in the US than in Europe
– although all surveys of European investors tend to
find that the fund managers are aiming to increase
their allocation to private equity. For instance, at the
most macro level, it is estimated that global invest-
ment in private equity funds currently totals less than
1  percent  of assets  under  management.  But  the
Russell Survey on Alternative Investing (2007) found
that target allocations by European investors into pri-
vate equity averaged 6.1 percent of total portfolios,
slightly behind the target for US investors (7.6 per-
cent) and somewhat above Japanese investors’ target
(4.5 percent). Even a very conservative interpretation
of these figures would imply a significant growth in
the  flow  of money  into  private  equity  in  years  to
come. 
What about the funds themselves? There are all sorts
of different players in this market. Most of the pure
private equity funds are structured as limited partner-
ships.  These  are  essentially  tax-efficient  investment
vehicles that have a limited duration – almost always
with a 10-year life. This limited life structure means
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that private equity funds are not investors who buy to
own the companies for the long term – they are buy-
to-sell investors. They want to make their investments,
create value and then exit. In usual market conditions,
the target holding-period would be 3–5 years, perhaps
longer  for  early-stage  venture  capital  investments.
During the credit boom, however, holding periods fell
significantly as abundant debt and equity capital pro-
vided quick exit opportunities.
Although  a  common  perception  of private  equity
funds is that they are “short-termist” investors, this
does  not  really  stand  up  to  scrutiny.  Of course,  it
depends  on  what  is  meant  by  short-termist.  If the
focus is on holding periods, the average period that
private equity funds invest in companies is consider-
ably longer than the average holding period for fund
managers who invest in public equity markets (usual
estimates  are  around  3  months  on  average).  If the
claim  is  that  constantly  having  to  report  quarterly
earnings  to  investors  shortens  the  time-horizons  of
managers, then this can hardly be true of private equi-
ty, where the investors have committed capital for up
to 10 years and are simply seeking the highest possi-
ble returns on their investment. 
There is, however, an interesting tension between the
ways that private equity performance is measured that
can give incentives for funds to seek an exit earlier
than might be optimal. The returns achieved by pri-
vate equity funds are judged according to two mea-
sures of performance – the main one is the absolute
return earned, or money multiple. For whatever cash
they commit, the investors care about how much cash
they get out, net of all the payments to the fund. A
good investment might earn 3, 4 or even higher multi-
ples of the original sum invested. Alternatively, the
investment may disappoint and return a fraction of
the  original  sum  after  a  few  years.  Focusing  on
absolute returns creates no incentives to exit an invest-
ment before value has been maximized. 
On the other hand, the second performance measure
is  the  internal  rate  of return  (IRR)  that  investors
achieve, which depends on how long it takes for the
investors  to  get  their  money  back.  Performance  of
alternative assets, such as private equity and hedge
funds, is often measured by IRRs. These capture the
precise timings of cash flows of funds from, and back
to, investors. This is important in the case of PE as
investors commit funds at a point in time but only
actually send the money to the fund when investment
opportunities arise. By focusing on IRRs, PE funds
have an incentive to return cash to investors quickly,
as the IRR measures both the extent of the returns
and  how  quickly  they  are  achieved.  So  a  profit
achieved in two years will have a higher IRR than if
the same profit took four years to achieve. 
Clearly these performance measures can conflict – an
early exit might be good for the IRR but deliver a
poor money multiple. In recent years, when credit was
abundant  and  banks  were  prepared  to  lend  ever-
increasing amounts of debt, many funds re-capital-
ized their portfolio companies by taking on addition-
al debt and paying out a dividend to investors. Such
financial  restructuring  will  significantly  boost  the
IRR but will (in itself) have no impact on the absolute
returns  earned  by  investors  (since  the  value  of the
equity  in  the  firm  has  reduced  in  line  with  the
increased  debt).  Of course,  there  might  be  tax  or
incentive advantages from such action (which are dis-
cussed more generally later) but there are also signifi-
cant transaction costs associated with debt issues. On
the whole, such recapitalizations are relatively benign
from  the  viewpoint  of the  investor,  so  long  as  the
portfolio company can operate comfortably with the
debt levels imposed on it. However, they demonstrate
the different incentives that funds face according to
the  performance  metric  used,  and  why  investors
should focus on both IRR and money multiples.
Given these performance measures, the private equity
firm has sharp incentives to create value, to exit the
investments and return the money to the investors. It
is worth stressing that the funds have to find a willing
buyer for their investments. Therefore, if private equi-
ty investors really did “sell off the assets”, or if the
companies they invested in were “milked for short-
term profits” and if they ultimately “let companies
die” (to précis the quotes from the introduction) they
would be acting against their own interests. The buy-
to-sell nature of private equity is only complete once
the sale has been agreed, and a healthy, efficient com-
pany is worth more than a ravaged shell. 
Furthermore, reputation and performance are partic-
ularly  critical  to  private  equity  organizations.
Partnership agreements do not let the funds reinvest
the proceeds in the next available opportunity – these
are not like mutual funds or hedge funds which shuf-
fle  their  holdings  and  only  return  the  money  if
investors ask for it. Funds can only be invested once,
and then must be returned to investors. This means
that private equity organizations regularly have to go
out and raise capital by launching a new fund. Thiscreates a dynamic industry where poor performance
results in rapid erosion of funds under management,
and in which the best performing private equity hous-
es can grow in size very rapidly, as new funds are mar-
keted to eager investors. 
For instance, the first European $1bn fund was raised
as recently as 1997, but funds of the successful firms
have grown hugely, with several $15bn funds being
raised in the last few years. In the US this growth of
the successful private equity organizations has gone
even further, with several leading firms diversifying
into various forms of debt funds, hedge funds, corpo-
rate finance advisory, and even securities underwrit-
ing. There has been a notable convergence between
the activities of investment banks and organizations
such as Blackstone and Texas Pacific Group, and it
remains  to  be  seen  how  far  this  convergence  goes,
especially  with  the  changing  business  models  being
forced on investment banks.
The final aspect that is worth highlighting is the way
that the private equity firm, which is the so-called gen-
eral partner (GP) of the partnership, is remunerated.
There are two components to the remuneration – a fee
for managing the fund, which is often 2 percent per
annum. It could be higher for successful venture cap-
ital firms (reflecting the generally smaller size of VC
funds)  and  will  usually  be  lower  –  perhaps  around
1.5 percent – for the much larger buy-out funds. This
fee is typically paid on the capital committed, not the
amount invested at any one time. So over the ten-year
life of a $10 billion fund a 1.5 percent management
fee  would  sum  up  to  $1.5bn.  Of course,  there  are
many different contractual variations that can lead to
lower or higher total fees. But the fact remains that
these are extraordinary sums of money, which, for the
larger funds, are many times the costs of running the
fund.  And  these  fees  are  guaranteed,  whatever  the
performance  of the  fund.  The  general  partner  also
shares in the profits of the fund. 
This profit share is the second part of the remunera-
tion and is referred to in the private equity world as
“carried  interest”.  The  carried  interest  is  almost
always set at 20 percent of the net profits earned by
investors and is only payable when the investment is
realized and the cash has flowed back to investors.
Usually  the  GPs  only  start  to  earn  carried  interest
once the LPs have received all their money back, plus
all the fees they have paid, plus a “hurdle rate” of
return, typically an 8 percent IRR. So if a $10bn fund
returns $20bn to its investors, the profits (after fees of,
say, $1.5bn, as above) would be $8.5 billion, and the
lucky few in the private equity fund who enjoy a share
of the carried interest would share 20 percent of this
– that is, $1.7bn. 
The remuneration enjoyed by partners in private equi-
ty funds are not, in general, reported, except to the
investors in the fund. However, the scale of the per-
sonal returns that can be earned by successful private
equity executives can be inferred from sources such as
the  prospectuses  of those  private  equity  firms  who
have chosen to conduct an IPO of their management
company (such as Blackstone and Apollo), from the
acquisition of trophy assets (such as Premiership foot-
ball clubs) and the entertainers who are engaged for
significant anniversary parties (such as Rod Stewart).
Furthermore, as will be discussed below, carried inter-
est is typically taxed at capital gains tax rates, which in
most  countries  are  significantly  below  marginal
income tax rates. This led to the powerful image, wide-
ly reported in the media, of private equity executives
paying lower tax rates than their cleaners.
So  private  equity  has  become  much  less  private  in
recent years. Large public companies are now within
the  grasp  of private  equity  funds,  unions  have
launched an effective campaign which has managed to
make the badge of “asset strippers” stick, the remu-
neration and taxation of private equity executives has
hit the headlines and the sector has become the sub-
ject of intense public scrutiny. As private equity has
grown in economic significance, and spread into new
countries,  a  number  of concerns  have  been  raised.
These  can  be  classified  into  three  main  areas:  the
impact of private equity ownership on portfolio com-
panies, the appropriate level of transparency and reg-
ulation, and taxation. The next sections consider each
of these in turn. 
3. The economic impact of private equity
The  case  for  private  equity  ultimately  depends  on
whether private equity creates value. For investors, the
extent of value creation – in terms of superior returns
– probably matters more than its source. But from a
public policy perspective, the source of investor re-
turns  matters:  if private  equity  creates  value  by
enhancing efficiency and creating stronger companies,
then a vibrant private equity sector should enhance
economic growth. On the other hand, if private equi-
ty returns derived mainly from increasing debt levels
and thereby reducing corporate taxes, then the impact
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on the overall economy would be
minimal: investor returns would
be  largely  matched  by  taxpayer
losses.1
These are the sorts of issues that
are driving public policy towards
private equity within Europe. We
discuss  the  tax  issues  in  more
detail  later,  but  some  countries
have responded to the growth of
private equity funds by restrict-
ing  the  interest  deductibility  of
debt. Whether such policy is sen-
sible depends in large part on the
economic impact of private equi-
ty.  In  this  section  we  start  by
reviewing the evidence on perfor-
mance, viewed from the perspec-
tive  of investors.  Then  we  con-
sider  the  evidence  on  the  ways
private equity funds create, or destroy, value. Clearly,
although value creation is the main focus of private
equity  funds,  public  policy  in  many  countries  has
paid rather more attention to whether private equity
ownership  creates  employment,  and  we  investigate
the evidence on this in section 3.3. Finally in this sec-
tion we consider whether the often highly-leveraged
structures employed in LBOs contribute to potential
systemic  financial  instability  through  increased
default risk.
3.1 Returns
Evidence on private equity returns is partial at best.
This is in large part because the private equity struc-
ture – a limited partnership – is a private contract
between investors and the fund. The investors in the
fund obtain detailed, regular updates on performance,
but such information is not generally available to oth-
ers, certainly not at the level of the performance of
individual  portfolio  companies.  Indeed,  partnership
agreements  would  often  specifically  prohibit  the
release of information to third parties. Some fund-
level data is published by public pension funds in the
US  –  such  as  the  California  Public  Employees’
Retirement System, one of the largest investors in pri-
vate equity – but more systematic and balanced data
on performance is simply not available at the present
time. 
This is not to say that data does not exist: various data
vendors  and  industry  associations  survey  both  LPs
and GPs to obtain evidence on return performance.
However,  as  discussed  in  more  detail  in  Jenkinson
(2008), the existing data suffers from significant sam-
ple selection issues, most of which probably bias the
reported returns in an upward direction.
In Table 3.1 we report the returns published by the
European  Private  Equity  and  Venture  Capital
Association (EVCA). This takes the longest possible
perspective  on  the  performance  of private  equity
within Europe, by estimating returns from the incep-
tion  of the  industry  in  the  mid-1980s  to  the  most
recent funds for which performance data is available.
The data measure the net return (after payment of
management  fees  and  carried  interest)  that  the
investors  would  have  received  from  investing  in  all
European private equity funds that are included in the
survey. 
As can be seen, the observed average private equity
returns in Europe differ hugely from venture capital
to buyouts. VC returns have been dreadful. Despite
public policy often giving inducements and subsidies
to VC, the net average returns – as measured by IRRs
– have barely kept pace with inflation. Indeed, when
looking at early-stage VC – investing in real start-ups
–  the  average  returns  have  been  slightly  negative,
meaning that investors have not even received all their
original  investment  back,  as  can  be  seen  from  the
average  investment  multiple  of 0.97.  However,  an
important  feature  of PE  returns  is  the  variability
1 Even in such a case, the fact that private equity-backed companies
benefitted from a lower post-tax cost of capital could have positive
economic effects, such as increasing levels of investment.
Table 3.1 
Cumulative pooled returns to European private equity






Early Stage – 0.8 13.1 0.41 0.56 0.97
Development 7.8 17.3 0.77 0.69 1.46
Balanced 6.8 19.9 0.66 0.62 1.28
All Venture
Capital 4.5 14.9 0.59 0.61 1.20
Buyout 16.3 34.2 0.93 0.6 1.53
Generalist 9.3 11.4 1.03 0.42 1.45
All private 
equity 11.8 23.5 0.88 0.58 1.46
This  table  pools all  the  funds  raised  within  Europe  since  1986  and 
measures the return on the entire portfolio as of December 2007, using 
both the internal rate of return (IRR) and the multiple of the original
investment that the funds returned to investors.
Source: EVCA (2008).across funds: whereas mutual funds may differ in per-
formance by a few percentage points over time, pri-
vate  equity  funds  have  hugely  differential  perfor-
mance. This can be seen in the European VC numbers:
the  average  return  of 4.5  percent  is  ten  percentage
points below the return obtained by the top quarter of
the funds. Manager selection in private equity is there-
fore critical. Of course, the problem is in anticipating
which  managers  will  be  the  top-performers  in  the
future. Although there is considerable variability, in
general  the  performance  of funds  focused  on
European venture capital has been hugely disappoint-
ing and has resulted in an exodus by investors.
In contrast, buyout returns have, on average – and
before risk-adjustment – been much more impressive.
Average  IRRs  have  been  around  16  percent  with
investors receiving around  1.5 for every  1 invested.
Again, however, there is huge variability, with the top
quartile of buyout funds producing IRRs of around
34 percent. These rather impressive returns are what
has attracted investors into European private equity,
where most of the funds have been targeted at buy-
outs, and, in particular, large buyouts (as witnessed
earlier in Figure 3.3).
However, one should not reach for the cheque-book
too rapidly! These returns are not risk-adjusted, and
this is potentially important given the extent of the
financial  leverage  employed  in  buyouts.  Simple
finance theory tells us that increasing use of debt will
increase expected equity returns to compensate for the
higher  level  of risk  borne  by  equity  holders.  This
might have seemed an academic nicety through the
boom period when asset prices, earnings, and leverage
were all increasing. But since the summer of 2007, the
relevance of such matters is now starting to become
apparent.  With  European  economies  now  in  reces-
sion, the market value of the equity stakes of many
private equity investments are collapsing, and in some
cases will already be negative. This does not mean the
private  equity  funds  will  abandon  such  companies,
but  it  does  point  to  some  fund  vintages  producing
very disappointing returns: investors with 2004 and
2005 vintage funds in their cellars will be watching
developments with some trepidation. 
Some hints as to the extent of the recent fall in the
value of private equity portfolios can be seen from the
public announcements of some of the funds, as well
as the evidence from funds that are themselves pub-
licly  quoted.  For  instance,  the  LPX  Europe  Index,
which measures the performance of 25 listed Euro-
pean private equity funds, fell by 64 percent during
2008. Of course, the public equity markets themselves
fell considerably over this period, and it remains to be
seen how public and private equity returns compare.
However, understanding the true risk and return char-
acteristics  of private  equity,  and  how  performance
compares with reasonable benchmarks, will be diffi-
cult until the required data – at the level of the port-
folio company – is made available by the funds or the
investors.  The  evidence  available  to  date,  notwith-
standing all these caveats, does suggest that the top-
performing funds can add significant value to their
portfolio  companies  and  produce  some  impressive
returns for investors. This is much more apparent at
the buyout end of the market, at least in Europe, than
in  venture  capital.  However,  the  recent  precipitous
falls  in  market  valuations  will  undoubtedly  tarnish
many performance records, including those of some
of the best-known funds.
3.2 Sources of value added
Whilst the overall returns earned by funds give some
measure of the attractiveness of private equity as an
asset  class,  from  an  economic  policy  perspective  it
matters how returns are derived. For instance, if the
returns of the high-performing funds are derived from
running business more efficiently, then public policy
should  be  supportive.  If all  the  gains  are  at  the
expense  of taxpayers  or  employees,  then  different
policies may apply.
A key issue, therefore, is an attribution analysis of the
sources of returns to private equity. Broadly speaking
there are three potential sources of value: increased
operating efficiency, more efficient capital structure,
and market timing or arbitrage. 
Despite the clear importance of attribution analysis,
little systematic evidence has been produced to date.
In large part this is because the required company-
level data is not generally available without the coop-
eration of the private equity funds. However, evidence
to this effect is beginning to emerge.
For instance, an interesting new study of UK compa-
nies  has  been  conducted  by  Acharya  and  Kehoe
(2008). They study the performance of large transac-
tions (>  100mn in enterprise value; the median EV
in the sample is  470mn) conducted by “large and
mature” private equity houses. This is not, therefore,
a study based on a stratified sample of the whole sec-
tor, and should be viewed more as giving an insight
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into how the successful funds – who are likely to be
large and mature – have an impact on their portfolio
companies.
The  sample  consists  of 66  portfolio  companies
acquired between 1996 and 2004; however, of these
29 involved  corporate  restructuring  in  the  form  of
acquisitions or divestments by the target firm. As we
shall see later, when discussing the effect of private
equity ownership on employment, a complication in
analyzing the impact of private equity ownership is
that significant corporate restructuring often occurs.
This makes it very difficult to trace the impact on the
original  company,  since  restructuring  often  over-
whelms organic growth (or decline). In this study, the
result  is  that  only  37  deals  in  the  sample  involved
“organic” growth.
These  companies  are  benchmarked  against  public
market comparators, and the authors try to identify
the extent of the risk-adjusted excess return, or, bor-
rowing from the hedge fund market, “alpha”. They
also, estimate the IRRs and investment multiples on
the deals. In general they focus on exited investments,
although 7 deals have not exited as yet. Clearly, this
focus may introduce a sampling bias, as an exit is
most  likely  once  growth  in  firm  value  has  been
achieved and the PE fund is in a position to provide
returns  for  its  investors.  On  the  other  hand,  only
when the investments have exited do we know the real
value created.
The authors find an alpha for their sample of private
equity investments of 9 percent p.a., which is statisti-
cally significant. Note, however, that for this compar-
ison with public markets, the sample selection biases
are very relevant. In terms of the sources of out-per-
formance,  they  find  that  much  of the  efficiency
improvements come from improved operating perfor-
mance,  in  particular  increasing  EBITDA  margins.
Therefore, the bottom line of this study is that private
equity ownership in this sample was associated with
outperformance  even  after  controlling  for  leverage
and risk. There is also no evidence of asset stripping:
the companies grew revenue more than their quoted
peers, increased capital expenditures and capital effi-
ciency.  They  also  increased  employment,  although
more slowly than their quoted peers. Strong incentive
structures,  active  management  and  a  clear  strategic
direction seem to be the factors driving the out-per-
formance – thereby giving some strong support to the
case for private equity as an alternative corporate gov-
ernance structure. 
Few comparable studies have been performed in other
European  countries,  or,  for  that  matter,  in  the  US.
However, Ernst and Young have produced an analysis
of the top 100 exits by private equity funds in 2007 –
which includes portfolio companies from Europe, the
US  and  Asia.  Again,  this  focus  on  exits  (and  the
largest exits) clearly creates some significant sample
selection biases, although as a study of “successful”
private  equity  transactions  it  nonetheless  has  some
value.
Not surprisingly – given the way the sample was con-
structed – the largest 100 private equity exits outper-
formed comparable public companies. Furthermore,
since the survey is based on exits that took place in
2007, and the average holding period of a company
by a PE fund is 3–4 years, the historical scope of the
survey is heavily weighted towards some of the most
advantageous  conditions  private  equity  has  ever
experienced. It is inconceivable that private equity-
held companies will create value at similar rates in
2008–9,  given  the  extent  of recent  markdowns  in
asset values.
In terms of the sources of value creation, the study
focuses on the growth in enterprise value and EBIT-
DA. In terms of EV the compound average growth
rate (CAGR) for private equity-owned companies was
24 percent compared with a public company bench-
mark of 12 percent. For private equity-owned compa-
nies the EBITDA CAGR was, on average, 16 percent,
compared with the public benchmark of 10 percent.
And in terms of EBITDA per employee, the private
equity-owned  companies  produced  a  CAGR  of
12 percent, compared with the public benchmark of
8 percent.
Clearly, there are serious questions about whether the
results regarding value creation apply across the sec-
tor. To date, the few studies that have been conducted
have tended to focus on the more successful exits and
more successful funds. However, these studies – and
other more stylized case-study evidence – suggest that
the claim that private equity creates value merely by
asset-stripping is false. At its most effective, private
equity  funds  clearly  do  create  value  during  their
tenure as owners. This tends to be by growing rev-
enues and margins. Managers are highly incentivized
and are required to operate with limited free cash flow
(after interest payments). When successful – and pri-
vate equity ownership is certainly no magic wand that
invariably produces wonderful results – the resultant
operational  efficiencies  are  magnified  by  the  highlyleveraged  structures  that  are  adopted.  Of course,
these amplification effects of leverage also work in
reverse, which implies that many PE-backed compa-
nies will seriously underperform their publicly-quoted
peers as the world moves into recession.
3.3 Employment
As should now be clear, the private equity model is
one of extremely sharp incentives on all parties – in
particular for the management of the portfolio com-
panies, and the private equity executives – to create
value for investors. This alignment of incentives is,
arguably, one of the key governance impacts of pri-
vate  equity  ownership.  Creating  value  is  therefore
the over-whelming goal of private equity, and other
possible desiderata – such as maintaining or creat-
ing employment – are not part of the contract. Just
like in any company that is trying to maximize its
value, employment should be optimized rather than
maximized. 
However, as the private equity sector has become the
focus of increasing attention, unions and politicians
have started to claim that the private equity model,
almost by construction, leads to job losses. Recall part
of the  earlier  quote  from  Poul  Nyrup  Rasmussen:
“assets are sold and workers are laid off”. The earlier
evidence on the sources of value creation cast doubt
upon the validity of this claim, but there have also
been a few other studies that have looked in detail at
the question of whether private equity companies cre-
ate or destroy jobs. 
Probably the most comprehensive study to date has
been carried out on US data by Davis et al. (2008).
This paper is instructive not only for the results they
derive but also in demonstrating how difficult it is to
estimate changes in employment levels at companies
that are changing their strategy and organization in
significant  ways.  Rather  than  focus  exclusively  on
employment at the overall firm level, the research also
delves into establishment-level data. This distinction
can be important: the sale of a division or business
unit would be recorded as a loss of employment at the
firm level, even though the establishment may contin-
ue  to  employ  exactly  the  same  number  of workers
under the new owner. Since many private equity trans-
actions involve a net sale of divisions or business unit,
an establishment-level analysis overcomes the poten-
tially  distorting  results  of corporate  restructuring.
However,  while  the  use  of establishment  data  has
some attractions, there are also some significant draw-
backs. In particular, since some business units are sold
to  other  companies,  tracking  establishments  for
5 years after an LBO, as the study does, means that it
is  not  possible  to  produce  a  clean  measure  of the
impact of continued private equity ownership. 
The study identifies 5,000 private equity-backed US
firms, covering more than 300,000 establishments, as
well as an additional 1.4 million establishments used
as  comparators,  matched  by  industry,  age,  size  etc.
Since most of the public policy issues that have been
raised  regarding  employment  relate  to  LBOs,  only
transactions  that  involved  leverage  are  considered.
Job creation and job destruction are considered sepa-
rately  as  gross  creation  and  destruction  dwarfs  net
changes. The authors focus on the employment path
relative  to  comparator  firms.  This  is  critical  as  all
establishments – irrespective of ownership – undergo
patterns of rise and fall, as new establishments replace
older ones.
Despite  all  these  caveats,  the  study  produces  some
interesting results. The rate of acquisitions, sales, new
plants and closures are approximately twice as high in
private equity-backed firms, so there is a much greater
extent of corporate restructuring. The net result for
employment on a firm-level basis, across all sectors, is
that those firms taken over by PE have 3.6–4.5 percent
fewer employees after two years, once all acquisitions
and exits are taken into account. For this part of the
study, the timescale is shortened to two years, to par-
tially mitigate the impact of major acquisitions and
divestments.
However, as noted earlier, this does not necessarily
imply that private equity ownership results in the loss
of jobs  in  the  overall  economy.  The  establishment-
level  analysis  gives  some  additional  clues,  though,
with the authors concluding that US establishments
taken over by PE have 10 percent fewer employees
after 5 years than if they had developed in line with
similar workplaces not subject to an LBO. However,
as noted earlier, this result has to be interpreted with
care as the establishments may have changed owner-
ship during this period. 
Overall, this study finds some relatively modest differ-
ences in employment, with private equity ownership
being associated with slightly lower levels of net job
creation. However, in addition to the caveats previ-
ously noted, there are various other general problems
in  drawing  conclusions.  In  particular,  although  the
authors are careful to conduct their analysis relative
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to a control group, it may well be that the sorts of
companies  that  private  equity  targets  are  precisely
those where inefficiency is high or where restructuring
is required. And, more generally, from a public policy
perspective it cannot be an objective to protect jobs
per se – the overarching objective is to create compet-
itive, valuable companies. What the study does show,
however, is that the perception of some commentators
of private equity as being slash-and-burn owners who
lay off most of the workers is quite unjustified.
No  similar  in-depth  study  has  been  performed  on
European  firms.  However,  there  have  been  some
attempts to measure the employment effects of private
equity.  The  European  Private  Equity  and  Venture
Capital Association (EVCA) produced a study that
reported various estimates of employment growth in
early stage firms and LBOs (see EVCA 2005). Perhaps
not surprisingly, all the evidence suggested early-stage
firms  grew  employment  rapidly,  with  the  headline
claim  being  that  630,000  new  jobs  were  created  by
VC-backed firms within Europe over the period 2000
04 – a growth rate in employment of 5.4 percent per
annum. The impact of LBOs was also claimed to be
very  positive,  with  an  estimated  growth  rate  of
employment of around 2.4 percent per annum, which
translated into 420,000 new jobs across Europe. 
However, there are various concerns about this analy-
sis. The impact of LBOs is based on a sample of just
99 portfolio companies that private equity funds had
invested in over the period 1997–2004. The sample
was derived from a voluntary on-line survey, which
raises various potentially serious concerns about sam-
ple-selection biases. In particular, knowing the politi-
cal environment within which private equity increas-
ingly  operates,  it  seems  likely  that  funds  would  be
more likely to complete the survey in respect of port-
folio  companies  where  employment  grew  strongly.
Furthermore, by considering the employment effects
at the firm level, the study encounters the problems
identified  earlier  regarding  restructuring.  In  an
attempt to focus on organic growth (or contraction)
the study excludes companies where employment lev-
els changed by more than 20 percent per annum, but
this does not really address the issue. Furthermore,
the  report  benchmarks  employment  levels  against
publicly quoted European comparators. It seems like-
ly that the latter may be larger and more mature than
the LBO sample, although no information comparing
the two groups is supplied. For all these reasons, the
very positive impact that LBOs are claimed to have on
employment levels needs to be interpreted with care. 
At the national level within Europe there have been
few studies that look at employment. One exception is
Amess and Wright (2007), which looks at UK-based
firms. One feature of this study is that it distinguishes
between  deals  where  the  private  equity  fund  works
with the existing management – referred to as man-
agement  buyouts  (MBOs)  –  and  those  where  new
management is introduced by the private equity own-
ers – referred to as management buy-ins (MBIs). The
sample for the analysis comprises 1350 firms that had
undergone an LBO. It is worth noting, however, that
the definitions employed could include younger com-
panies seeking growth capital (which might have low
or no debt), as well as more mature companies. Hence
it is questionable whether this study really focuses on
the LBOs that have caught the attention of politicians
and unions.
As in the other studies, comparator firms are identi-
fied and employment growth compared at the level of
the firm. Companies are excluded if assets change by
more than 100 percent in any one year, which is a fair-
ly coarse control for restructuring effects. The authors
conclude that employment growth is 0.5 percent per
annum higher for MBOs and 0.8 percent per annum
lower for MBIs as compared with the control group.
Leaving aside the general problems, discussed earlier,
regarding inference in these firm-level studies, these
results seem directionally plausible. To the extent that
MBOs  can  really  be  distinguished  from  MBIs,  one
might expect the latter – where new management is
being introduced to replace the old – to be associated
with  more  job  cuts.  On  the  other  hand,  the  cases
where incumbent management is supported by incom-
ing private equity investors might be those companies
that have been run more efficiently.
Overall, an interpretation of the results regarding the
impact of private equity on employment is complex.
Indeed, given that in many cases private equity own-
ers execute significant changes in corporate strategy,
it is difficult to even construct an appropriate coun-
terfactual. For instance, comparing with public com-
panies may not be appropriate if they are not subject
to  significant  changes  in  strategy.  And  strategic
changes are very idiosyncratic. The ability to com-
pare “organic”employment creation or destruction is
therefore limited. Overall, however, the results seem
to  suggest  that  employment  grows,  if anything,  at
somewhat  lower  rates  under  private  equity  owner-
ship. Whether this is a good or bad thing is another
matter. But the claims of some unions and politicians
that private equity funds sack workers and cripple thecompanies are based more on anecdotal than system-
atic evidence.
3.4 Financial distress
So far in this section we have reviewed the evidence on
financial  returns,  the  sources  of returns,  and  the
impact on employment. However, given the extensive
leverage employed by private equity funds in many
buyouts, should we expect to observe financial dis-
tress among portfolio companies, and imploding of
funds in the manner witnessed amongst hedge funds?
The short answer to these questions is yes and no.
Starting  with  the  issue  of the  impact  on  funds,  as
noted previously, PE funds are not leveraged within
the fund itself. Leverage is used to acquire the portfo-
lio company, which is kept within the acquired firm,
and has recourse neither to the fund nor to the other
portfolio  companies.  So,  if an  individual  portfolio
company becomes bankrupt, the equity stake of the
private equity fund would become worthless, and the
debt providers would take over ownership and control
of the company. Of course, this will harm the returns
of the PE fund – as their investment is written down
to zero – but the impact does not spread to other com-
panies in the portfolio. 
Furthermore,  investors  commit  money  to  private
equity funds for up to ten years, and so cannot with-
draw capital if a fund is doing poorly or if recession
takes hold. In contrast, hedge funds attracted capital
that was far more mobile: many hedge funds allowed
withdrawals  by  investors  with  only  a  few  months
notice. The value of the “patient capital” provided by
investors in private equity funds has only become fully
appreciated in recent months, as
investors  have  been  scrambling
for  liquidity.  Hedge  funds  have
been  experiencing  large-scale
redemption requests by investors,
and little new capital being com-
mitted.  In  some  cases  this  has
resulted in huge asset sell-offs by
hedge funds – often into markets
with few buyers – and the mis-
match  between  the  relative  liq-
uidity  of investor  commitments
and the illiquidity of many of the
underlying  assets  has  caused
enormous  problems.  In  many
cases  hedge  funds  have  had  to
invoke  “lock-up” clauses  to
restrict  investor  withdrawals,  to
allow a more orderly run-down of the fund. The main
problem  that  PE  funds  are  experiencing  is  some
investors are becoming seriously over-committed, in
terms of asset-allocation, to private equity, given the
slowdown in the rate at which capital is being returned
to investors. But withdrawal of existing investments,
which would impact on the portfolio companies, is
simply not possible.2
Of course, although the private equity fund structure
provides long-term capital commitments, they are still
exposed to the current economic realities of falling
asset  prices,  falling  liquidity  and  rapidly  worsening
macroeconomic  conditions.  While  the  funds  them-
selves  will  not  implode,  will  some  of the  portfolio
companies  experience  financial  distress  and  bank-
ruptcy? As noted earlier, the answer to this question is
undoubtedly “yes”. However, such problems are like-
ly to be less acute in the short-term than might be
assumed, given that private equity funds have been
buying  assets  at  record  prices  and  taking  on  large
amounts of debt (as shown by figure 3.2). 
Why? Because PE funds made good use of the boom
in leveraged finance in the last few years to borrow at
low  interest  rates  on  relatively  lenient  terms  from
banks  and  other  providers  of debt  financing.
Leveraged loans for private equity buyouts are priced
relative to inter-bank interest rates such as LIBOR or
EURIBOR. As figure 3.4 shows, not only were inter-
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2 There is, however, a growing secondary market in private equity
investments. Recently some high-profile investors, such as Harvard
University and the Wellcome Trust, have announced that they intend
to sell some of their existing investments. However, these would be
sales of partnership interests to other investors, and so would not
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est  rates  low,  but  the  average  spreads  on  leveraged
loans  stayed  low  as  lending  multiples  rose.
Consequently, credit metrics – such as interest cover-
age – did not deteriorate as much as one might assume
from the raw figures on the extent of debt. 
Furthermore, much of the debt provided for private
equity buyouts was both relatively long-term – typi-
cally loans have a 7–9 year term – and had a signifi-
cant non-amortising proportion. Most corporate debt
requires  both  interest  payments  and  repayments  of
principal during the life of the loan. However, much
of the debt used to fund buy-outs has involved “bul-
let” re-payments whereby the principal is only repaid
at the end of the term of the loan. Indeed, for some
portions of the debt, interest payments may not be
required or may be at the discretion of the borrower.
These “payment in kind” and “toggle payment” fea-
tures became common during 2006 and 2007 and will
provide borrowers with valuable flexibility. As long as
the company can continue to meet the required inter-
est  payments,  financial  distress  may  be  delayed  or
avoided  completely.  As  Europe  has  entered  what
looks like a deep recession and banks remain reluc-
tant to either extend or re-finance loans, the value of
such  long-term  funding  with  low  repayments  will
become apparent.
A  final  feature  of the  leverage  boom  was  that
covenants  associated  with  loan  agreements  became
looser. An extreme version of this phenomenon was
the “cov-lite” loans that many private equity funds
negotiated for their portfolio companies. Such loans
have few on-going requirements, in terms of main-
taining particular credit or balance sheet ratios, other
than to keep paying the agreed interest on the debt. Of
course, even paying the interest will be impossible for
some companies, but this is not only true for private
equity-owned companies but for the corporate sector
in  general.  However,  the  relatively  permissive  loan
agreements that were the norm during the leverage
boom will reduce the number of companies entering
financial distress.
In  summary,  many  private  equity  funds  took  full
advantage of the leverage boom by negotiating large,
long-term  loans  that  give  their  portfolios  unusual
amounts  of flexibility  in  terms  of repayment.  The
terms of such borrowing will help to reduce, but not
eliminate,  the  number  of portfolio  companies  that
suffer financial distress. 
So who paid the price for this historically unprece-
dented extension and pricing of credit? The answer is,
those  that  arranged  and  ultimately  provided  such
leveraged lending. Often the lending was arranged by
investment banks, and in some cases they took the
entire deal onto their books before finding investors
for the debt. This resulted in a huge overhang of un-
syndicated leveraged loans whose market prices fell
dramatically as the credit crisis developed. Leveraged
loans certainly played their part in the downfall of the
investment banks, but the private equity funds were –
on the whole – acting entirely rationally in accepting
as much mispriced debt that they were offered. 
The other main losers were the plethora of financial
institutions that invested in leveraged loans as they
were pooled, tranched, structured, enhanced (or not)
and distributed around the financial system. Hedge
funds, collateralized loan obligations, monoline insur-
ers, banks and insurance companies all shared in the
pain.  And,  ironically,  they  now  find  some  private
equity funds offering to buy back the debt at a frac-
tion of the face value.
However, there is one sting in the tail of the leverage
bubble.  As  noted  earlier,  the  lack  of covenants  on
many loans reduces the likelihood of default, even if
the  equity  in  the  company  is  essentially  worthless.
There are likely to be a significant number of compa-
nies that were bought by private equity funds at the
top of the market where the prospects of them ever
recovering their investment, let alone make a reason-
able return, is low, certainly for the next few years. In
normal circumstances, such companies would default
and the private equity owners would hand the keys to
the bankers who would take over control of the com-
pany. Losing the entire equity stake is clearly bad, but
when the outcome is reasonably quick it enables the
private equity executives to move onto more produc-
tive activities, such as adding value to more promising
companies  or  sourcing  new  investments.  Cov-lite
loans  are  likely  to  result  in  a  growing  number  of
“zombie” companies – the living dead who only sur-
vive due to the generous borrowing taken out at the
top of the market. Such firms may take much longer
to default – in some cases this may be delayed until
loans have to be re-financed after around 7–9 years.
As a result, private equity funds will have to continue
to manage and nurture such companies, even if the
beneficiaries of this effort are mainly the banks and
other  investors  who  provided  the  debt  financing
rather than the equity investors. 
In summary, leveraging any asset increases risk and
expected  return.  This  amplifies  positive  returns  ingood market conditions and similarly amplifies nega-
tive returns when economic conditions worsen. There
is no doubt that as the European economy now has
entered recession the incidence of default and finan-
cial distress will rise, for all companies, whether pri-
vate equity-owned or not. Although the amount of
debt  taken  on  by  private  equity  buyouts  in  recent
years hit record levels, the terms of such loans were
also  historically  unprecedented  in  their  leniency.  It
remains to be seen how these two factors balance in
the coming months. 
4. Transparency and regulation
Within Europe considerable attention has been devot-
ed to whether private equity should be regulated and,
if so,  how.  It  is  worth  noting  that  private  equity
remains an asset class that is largely the domain of
institutional investors. Although retail investors can
gain exposure to private equity through certain funds
that  operate  publicly  listed  vehicles  (such  as  3i,
Candover, etc.), or through asset managers who put
together portfolios of private equity investments, indi-
viduals (other than the “ultra-high-net-worth”) can-
not gain access to direct investments in the underlying
limited partnerships.
Of all the European countries, the UK has seen more
activity  by  private  equity  funds,  both  in  terms  of
investment in companies, and in terms of the location
of many of the private equity professionals. In part
this is because the UK was one of the first countries
to agree the status and taxation of limited partner-
ships, but also because the UK has a long-standing
laissez-faire  approach  towards  corporate  ownership
and M&A activity. It has also, in recent years, been
the country where the private equity industry has been
under the most scrutiny.
The first major review of the private equity industry
was undertaken by the Financial Services Authority
in 2006 (see FSA, 2006). This report broadly gave
the  industry  a  clean  bill  of health,  although  the
potential for conflicts of interest between the LPs
and  the  GPs  was  identified  as  warranting  further
investigation.  The  FSA  therefore  produced  a  the-
matic review of conflicts of interest, which was pub-
lished in July 2008 (FSA, 2008). This report noted
that,  in  general,  “funds  operated  business  models
with a high degree of alignment between the inter-
ests of managers and fund investors”. This is not
surprising, since the limited partnership agreements
are the subject of extensive discussion between the
LPs and the GPs, with both sides being advised by
lawyers and specialized consultants. Some investors
obtained  better  terms  than  others  (for  instance,
early “cornerstone” investors), but more often funds
operated with strict equal-treatment rules regarding
investor terms. In general the level of disclosure and
reporting by the funds was judged to be extensive
and widespread. 
An interesting theme that recurs through all the vari-
ous reviews and investigations is that investors report
few  problems  with  private  equity  funds.  They  have
access to regular detailed reports on the performance
of the  individual  portfolio  companies  and  on  the
overall fund, and are fully informed about the returns
and payments of fees and any carried interest to the
GPs. So whilst private equity investments are indeed
private, subject only to general laws relating to all pri-
vate  companies  or  transactions,  there  are  no  issues
regarding  transparency  or  information  asymmetry
between the investors and the funds.
So, two sophisticated parties agree to do business, and
both  are  happy  with  the  outcome.  Reputations  are
critical, and funds are strictly time-limited, so any bad
behaviour or poor performance would likely jeopar-
dize  raising  a  future  fund.  Entry  into  the  industry
constantly  occurs,  as  experienced  individuals  leave
larger organizations to form their own funds, on the
back  of previous  successful  transactions.  Why  the
public concern? 
The answer to this question is largely political. As
private equity started acquiring much larger organi-
zations some of which were household brands – such
as the AA or Boots in the UK – public attention
grew. However, a critical role was played by trade
unions  in  the  UK  and  elsewhere,  who  focused  on
examples  where  private  equity-owned  companies
shut down plants and/or reduced employment. As
noted  in  the  previous  section,  whilst  such  cases
undoubtedly exist, it is far from clear whether pri-
vate  equity  owners,  on  balance,  create  or  destroy
more  jobs  than  other  forms  of ownership.
Nonetheless, the power of example was strong, and
private  equity  firms,  lacking  experience  in  dealing
with  anyone  other  than  their  limited  circle  of
investors, proved unable to shake off the labels of
job-destroyers and asset-strippers. 
In the UK this led to the industry association, the
BVCA, forming a high-level working group, chaired
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by  Sir  David  Walker,  to  investigate  disclosure  and
transparency in private equity. Again the dog did not
bark: investors were satisfied with the level of disclo-
sure and transparency. The final recommendations of
the review therefore focused on enhanced reporting
and communication to the general public. 
Most of the recommendations on enhanced report-
ing are relatively modest, and some funds probably
already satisfied many of them. The review suggest-
ed additional reporting – over and above what any
private company would be required to report – by
larger portfolio companies owned by larger private
equity funds. With a nod to the unions, the size cri-
teria  for  this  enhanced  reporting  include  employ-
ment levels (at least 1,000 UK employees) as well as
the  value  of the  company  (over  £500mn,  or  over
£300mn in the case of public-to-private transactions,
where the public would have previously had access to
more information). Such firms are required to pub-
lish  their  annual  reports  on  their  website  within
6 months of the year-end, reveal which private equi-
ty funds own them and to publish a business and
financial  review,  including  information  relevant  to
employees and other stakeholders. To date, 53 com-
panies have signed up to this enhanced level of dis-
closure.
The other strand of recommendations related to the
private equity firms themselves. Those (generally larg-
er) firms that own portfolio companies that are sub-
ject to the enhanced reporting, are required to publish
an annual report giving information on their invest-
ment approach, their portfolio companies, the broad
geographic distribution of their investors and infor-
mation about the top management. To date, 32 firms
have agreed to communicate such information to the
general  public,  and  a  monitoring  group  has  been
established to ensure compliance with this voluntary
code.
The first batch of these reports have been produced
and, in some cases, make interesting reading. But, on
average,  they  are  about  as  interesting  as  the  glossy
annual reports from public companies that are often
assigned rapidly to the re-cycling bin! It is debatable
whether the benefits of such reporting and communi-
cation outweigh the costs.
The  final  recommendation  of the  Walker  Review
acknowledged – correctly – that the industry should
“undertake  rigorous  evidence-based  analysis  of the
economic impact of private equity activity”. As noted
in the previous section, evidence on the extent, and
sources, of the value created by private equity owner-
ship remains incomplete and largely anecdotal. The
first  report  BVCA  (2009),  has  just  been  published.
Although  it  includes  some  interesting  analysis,  the
current dataset – with just 14 exited investments – is
too small to draw any general conclusions. 
Many other countries across Europe have been con-
ducting their versions of the Walker Review. During
June 2008 both the Danish and the Swedish industry
associations published their reviews of the appropri-
ate extent of transparency and disclosure. In most
important  respects  these  mirror  the  approach  sug-
gested by the Walker review – in particular the estab-
lishment of a code of practice defined and policed by
the  industry  itself,  rather  than  the  introduction  of
new  statutory  requirements.  There  are,  of course,
local differences, which in the main relate to the rele-
vant size of companies and funds (for example, the
Danish proposals cover over one-half of the private
equity funds in Denmark, whereas the Walker pro-
posals are relevant to only about 15 percent of UK
private equity funds), and the extent to which existing
laws  already  require  adequate  reporting  by  private
companies, engagement with workers and board rep-
resentation.
Other European countries have followed suit and have
produced  their  own  transparency  proposals.  What
seems likely is that the pressure for a set of common
guidelines that apply across Europe will grow. However,
it remains to be seen who exactly benefits from this
increased  transparency  and  reporting.  After  all,  the
investors already have all the information they could
possibly  desire.  Whilst  these  reviews  by  the  various
industry associations have, for the time being, calmed
the political storm, a sober cost-benefit analysis might
well question the value of these voluntary codes. 
We now turn to a final set of public policy issues relat-
ing to taxation that continue to attract public atten-
tion to the private equity industry.
5. Taxation issues raised by private equity
Two main policy issues have been raised regarding pri-
vate equity: whether the tax system actually encour-
ages LBOs and results in a reduction in national tax
revenues, and whether the tax treatment of the private
equity  executives’ carried  interests  in  the  funds  is
appropriate and fair. We consider these in turn.5.1 Tax deductibility of debt
Most tax systems allow tax-deductibility of interest
expenses on debt at the corporate level. And most tax
systems treat equity financing less generously, by not
allowing full tax deductibility of dividend payments
or retained earnings. As a result, most companies have
an  incentive  at  the  margin,  other  things  equal,  to
increase the use of debt to reduce their post-tax cost
of capital. The tax benefits have to be weighed against
the potential costs – such as the reduction in financial
flexibility or the probability of financial distress – but
for  many  companies  the  potential  net  gains  from
increasing leverage are significant. 
Private equity funds often transform the capital struc-
ture of companies they acquire, and thereby take full
advantage  of the  tax  deductibility  of interest  pay-
ments. This can significantly reduce the amount of
corporation taxes flowing into the public coffers. As a
result, many countries, both in Europe and elsewhere,
have  started  to  question  whether  the  tax  system
should allow full tax-deductibility for interest expens-
es, and thereby discourage the more leveraged capital
structures.3
In large part such moves seem motivated by a view
that, beyond a certain point, leveraged capital struc-
tures are only motivated by the potential tax savings,
and so should therefore be discouraged. On the other
hand, the potential benefits of leverage extend beyond
tax issues. As noted in a seminal paper by Jensen and
Meckling (1976), debt can help to overcome agency
issues by removing free cash-flow and sharpening the
incentives of managers. The optimal level of debt will
vary significantly between companies, depending on
all sorts of considerations (the stability of revenues,
operational leverage, competition etc.). It seems likely
that any simple tax rule to limit the tax deductibility
of interest payments will constrain some companies
from implementing perfectly legitimate capital struc-
tures. For such companies, the post-tax cost of capital
will be increased relative to their international com-
petitors. 
The  other  main  motivation  for  restricting  the  tax-
deductibility of interest payments resulted from con-
cern about the impact on national tax revenues. To
some extent one would expect that as more debt is
used, tax revenues should increase from the providers
of debt capital. In the past this used to be provided by
local  banks,  whose  taxable  profits  might  rise  as  a
result.  However,  during  the  recent  leverage  boom,
much of the debt was provided by hedge funds, CLO
funds and others, many of whom operated offshore.
As a result, the flowback of taxes from debt providers
was less likely to occur. Whilst undoubtedly true, at
the current time the prospect of even banks paying
taxes  on  profits  appears  some  way  off,  and  few  of
these new financial players are likely to be providing
finance for some time. In any case, this is really just an
example of the difficulties national governments are
finding levying taxes on the corporate sector within a
global financial system. It is not hard to relocate a
company to a jurisdiction that does not impose such
rules, or to organize the tax affairs of a company to
channel profits to lower-tax countries. Rules to arbi-
trarily limit the capital structure choices of companies
are unlikely to be either efficient or effective in main-
taining tax revenues. 
It is worth making one further observation regarding
the tax benefits of leverage. In large part the benefi-
ciaries of these tax benefits are likely to be the vendors
of the companies that are acquired by private equity
funds, rather than the investors in the private equity
fund. Why? Because leverage is a commodity that is
available  to  all  reputable  private  equity  funds.
Provided the companies are acquired in a competitive
process, any tax benefits of leverage should be reflect-
ed in the purchase price paid by the private equity
funds  –  i.e.  as  part  of the  takeover  premium.
Therefore, the main impact of rules to restrict the tax-
deductibility  of debt  may  be  felt  by  the  owners  of
existing assets, rather than in the returns reported by
private equity funds.
5.2 How should carried interests be taxed?
The second area of public debate regarding the taxa-
tion of private equity relates to the taxation of those
working in the sector. In particular, in both the US
and Europe, the taxation of the carried interests of
the private equity executives has become the subject
of considerable  debate  in  the  media  and  amongst
politicians. 
The issue is essentially whether these carried interests
– the share of the profits made by the fund – should
be treated as capital gain or income? This is a complex
issue. The GPs are committing capital to the funds, so
capital gains tax has some justification. On the other
hand, they obtain the carried interests as a result of
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their role as employees of the fund, and so carried
interest looks much like a profit share, which would
normally be subject to income taxes. 
A full discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of
this chapter, although a good summary of the issues
is provided by Lawton (2008). However, the current
tax  treatment  in  many  European  countries  appears
very generous, especially when capital gains tax rates
are reduced to low levels for longer-term holders of
assets  (concessions  which  normally  benefit  private
equity  executives).  However,  dealing  with  the  com-
plexities of any such reform should not be under-esti-
mated. For instance, those countries – such as the UK
– which have responded to the political out-cry by
simply increasing capital gains tax rates (or removing
taper relief) are potentially harming all sorts of other
entrepreneurial incentives in a quest to raise taxes on
private  equity  GPs.  Such  issues  have  undoubtedly
moved down the political agenda in the current envi-
ronment, with future carried interest payments likely
to  fall  significantly,  and  private  equity  funds  being
among the few with capital to invest. But these issues
are likely to re-emerge in due course.
6. Conclusions
Private equity plays an increasingly important role in
the financial system. Despite recent market turmoil,
the  private  equity  model  of ownership  and  gover-
nance is here to stay. Although it has attracted much
negative publicity in recent years, in particular within
some  European  countries,  many  of the  negative
claims regarding the impact of private equity on the
economy are not supported by the evidence. 
A major issue facing private equity funds is that there
is little understanding of how they add value. This is
in part due to the culture of privacy within the indus-
try,  which  is  a  major  impediment  to  public  under-
standing of the role of private equity in the economy.
Whilst some analysis has been published, it is often
selective and partial, and frequently funded and vet-
ted by industry associations. For many of the success-
ful funds there is good story to tell, but to date only
the large institutional investors have heard it. As a
result,  the  claims  of private  equity  funds  are  often
greeted with scepticism. 
One outcome of the veil of secrecy has been the push
to increase transparency in many countries. As dis-
cussed, whilst no bad thing, this is likely to have lim-
ited  impact.  The  investors  in  private  equity  funds
already  had  access  to  regular,  detailed  reporting.
There is no information asymmetry for those provid-
ing the capital, and, if there was, then as some of the
largest and most sophisticated global investors they
could obtain any information they desired. It is not
clear that private companies should have to comply
with  different  standards  of reporting  according  to
who the owners are. In general, the Walker Review,
and  similar  initiatives  in  other  countries,  may  have
some effect at the margin in terms of information flow
to  employees  and  other  interested  parties  but  is
unlikely to satisfy the critics.
Another response to the growth in private equity has
been to amend tax policies. At the corporate level, tax
policies to make leveraged buyouts more difficult or
costly  have  questionable  justification  and  uncertain
impact.  The  optimal  capital  structure  will  differ
between  companies,  and  restricting  the  tax-
deductibility of debt will either raise the post-tax cost
of capital or encourage tax avoidance by companies
that  find  themselves  constrained  by  the  policy.  In
many cases the main impact of such policies is likely
to be felt by the existing owners of companies that
might be acquired by private equity funds rather than
in the returns earned by private equity funds them-
selves. At the personal level the taxation of private
equity executives is an area that warrants careful con-
sideration as it is debatable whether their profit shares
should be taxed as capital gains as opposed to income,
or some hybrid of the two. But given the internation-
al nature of the industry, it is questionable how much
money would be raised, and poorly thought-out poli-
cy might result in significant changes in the location
of the funds. 
Finally, although the future returns earned by private
equity funds that invested heavily in the period prior
to the leverage bubble bursting in August 2007 are
likely to be poor, the extent of financial distress and
bankruptcy of the portfolio companies may be lower
than might be expected. In large part this is due to the
fact that private equity funds took full advantage of
the unprecedentedly generous terms associated with
debt financing during the leverage bubble. Whilst the
investment banks, hedge funds and CLO funds that
provided the debt have witnessed spectacular losses,
many  of the  portfolio  companies  themselves  now
enjoy long-term fixed rate, cheap debt financing with
few covenants. Of course, as the European economy is
in  recession,  leverage  increases  the  susceptibility  to
financial  distress  and  bankruptcy,  and  there  is  nodoubt that some high-profile bankruptcies will occur.
But the financial structure employed by many private
equity funds may enable many of their portfolio com-
panies to continue operating without defaulting long
enough to see through the recession. What is in no
doubt  is  that  holding  periods  will  lengthen,  invest-
ment rates will slow, the terms of future lending will
return  to  historical  norms  and  that  most  existing
funds will witness significantly reduced returns.
However,  history  informs  us  that  some  of the  best
periods to invest in private equity are at the start of a
recession, when asset prices are low and the need for
rapid corporate transformations is at a premium. It is
not surprising, therefore, that private equity fundrais-
ing continues, and investor surveys show an increase
in asset allocation to private equity. Economies need a
diversity  of sources  of capital,  and  public  policy
should  let  the  market  decide  which  source  is  most
appropriate for a given company, without imposing
tax  or  other  regulatory  restrictions  to  favour  one
source over another.
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